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PROCREATIONAL AUTONOMY V. STATE
INTERVENTION: OPPORTUNITY OR CRISIS FOR A
BRAVE NEW WORLD?
GEORGE P. SMITH, II*

Although the question of whether an ovum that has been
fertilized is a baby or has the "moral certainty" of becoming
one should not be viewed as a uniquely "Catholic" or religious question,' but rather as a question best answered by
scientists,2 the fact remains that ethicists and theologians
have been grappling with this very question for quite some
time.' This question and its "answers," together with their
various permutations, structure the framework upon which
today's laws are interpreted and future ones enacted.
The official teaching of the Catholic Church is simple
and direct: at all stages of life, from fertilization through
adulthood, human life is to be accorded equal protection."
Yet, prominent Church theologians continue to question this
official magisterium by positing that-based upon their studies of the advances of reproductive biology'-"truly human
life" cannot be recognized until two or three weeks after fertilization.' Accepting this position would thus condone the
right to perform tests upon excess frozen embryos-undertaken as such to conduct genetic experiments-with the end result being the abortion (or death) of
the embryo upon completion of the experiment. For some,
this action is abhorrent; for others, it is recognized as a scientifically humane undertaking, grounded in utilitarianism,
whose singular purpose is to explore the science of genetics
*

Professor of Law, Catholic University of America.
1. Blum, Moral Foundations of American Democracy, 1 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 65, 67 (1984).
2.

M. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE chs. 5-7 (1983).

3. Tauer, The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the
Early Embryo, 45 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 3 (1984).
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with the hope of improving the genetic profile or genetic
pool of mankind by ridding it of inheritable diseases. 7
The issue of when individuality is established biologically
and when the law should, accordingly, protect such individuals, was determined by the United States Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade, 8 when it held, in essence, that the full protection
of the laws could not be extended to a fetus until it was
born. 9 Interestingly, in March, 1983, Mr. Chief Justice, Sir
Harry Gibbs, of the Australian High Court, ruled "that a foetus has no right of its own until it is born and has a separate
existence from its mother." 10 The common law tied the commencement of life to the time when an unborn first moved in
the womb-or, in other words, when it quickened." Thus, it
was only after the fetus quickened that its destruction could
be classifed as murder."
7. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS: MICROORGANISMS, PLANTS AND ANIMALS (1981). G. SMITH,
GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW (1981); Smith, Eugenics and Family Planning: Exploring the Yin and the Yang, 8 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 4 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Eugenics and Family Planning]; Williamson, Gene Therapy, 298
NATURE 416 (1982).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. It is only when the fetus reaches a "compelling" point of viability or that time when it "presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside of the mother's womb" that the state's interest in protecting fetal
existence will be asserted. Id. at 163-64. It is at the third trimester of development that the state's interest becomes controlling. See infra note 107;
King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection of the
Unborn, in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW
WORLD 110 (G. Smith ed. 1982).
10. Attorney General for Queensland ex rel. Kerr v. T., 57 A.L.J.R.
285 (Austl. 1983).
And in Canada, Mr. Justice Matheson of the Saskatchewan Court of
Queen's Bench held that a fetus was not to be regarded as a person within
the meaning of the law and thus not within the scope of the term "everyone" as used in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]veryone has the right to life . . .
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice." Borowski v. Attorney-General of Canada, 4 D.L.R. 4th 112, 121 (1983) (quoting CAN. CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS

§ 7).

11. Gavigan, The Criminal Sanction as it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of the Statutory Prohibition of Abortion, 5 J. LEGAL HIST. 20
(1984).
12. Id. at 21. The present position is summarized:
A child is not considered in law to be in being, so as to be the
subject of a charge of murder or manslaughter, until the whole
body of the child is extruded from the womb and has an existence
independent of the mother. Whether the child has an indepen-
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The new reproductive biology, in all its complexity,
promises untold opportunities for resolving heart-breaking
problems of infertility and will clearly expand the meaning of
the very term, procreational autonomy, as a reference to
both unmarried and married women. Still, the new biology
presents equally untold problems for the physician, lawyer,
ethicist, theologian and, for that matter, the average person."8 This article will consider, essentially, one major medical, legal, ethical and religious challenge of the new reproductive biology: in vitro fertilization (IVF). The article will
first survey the force of religion in shaping new attitudes and
directions in this area and then summarize the ethical and
philosophical concerns about the use and development of
IVF procedures. The now famous case of the frozen "orphan" embryos of Melbourne, Australia will serve as a focal
paradigm for analysis and point of reference to the work of
two study commissions-the Waller Committee in Australia
and the Warnock Committee in England-that have charted
investigative parameters for work and experimentation in in
vitro fertilization procedures. Finally, the article will probe
the complications of complete utilization of IVF by unmarried women and its devastating effect on the sanctity of the
family unit. This article concludes that as long as procreation
continues to remain the central driving force in a marital relationship and, indeed, in a progressive society, men will undertake new and sometimes controversial endeavors-with or
without state or religious approval-in order to expand the
period of fecundity and combat infertility. The state must begin to regulate the field now, rather than allow it to develop
haphazardly.
I.

LAW AND RELIGION: PARTNERS OR ANTAGONISTS?

That faith and religion have played a dynamic role in the
dent existence turns upon whether it has an independent circulation, and has breathed or has a capacity for independent breathing. But a child may have an independent existence even though it
has not drawn breath and even though the umbilical cord is not
severed. In relation to the law of homicide a person continues in
being until his being is extinguished by death.
11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 1153 (4th ed. 1976).
13. See Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and the New
Biology, 3 PACE U. L. REV'. 63 (1982); Smith, Uncertaintieson the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and the New Biology, 41 PHAROS MED. J. 10 (1978); Smith,
Manipulating the Genetic Code: JurisprudentialConundrums, 64 GEo. L. REV.
697 (1976).
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political life of the United States is a given. 4 Indeed, the
very "bedrock of moral order is religion."'" Thus, politics
and morality become inseparable.' 6 "And as morality's foundation is religion, religion and politics are necessarily related.
We need religion as a guide; we need it because we are imperfect. ' 1 7 Religious values have, throughout history, played
an important part in public policy debates.' 8 In fact, today's
democratic commitment to pluralism is nurtured and sustained as a consequence of that insistence on recognizing the
inviolability of individual conscience. 9 To exclude societal
values, which are grounded in a religious base, from the public arena would pose a serious threat to the very principle of
pluralism.20
An obvious distinction must be made between moral and
religious principles and the subsequent application of those
principles in the public forum. Principles may be agreed
upon, yet without sacrificing Catholic integrity, disagreement
may exist as to their political application.2 Indeed, Dignitatis
Humanae, the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom, affirmed specifically the principle of religious
freedom for Catholics and non-Catholics alike, and foreswore
the use of coercion of any nature in forcing the exercise of a
particular act of faith.2 From the time of Archbishop John
Carroll to the present, the fundamental principle of the separation of church and state has always been accepted by the
American hierarchy.2 3 Yet, while all churches have tried to
avoid political involvement with the state, they have refused
steadfastly to limit their participation in the formation of naReagan, Politics and Morality are Inseparable, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
7 (1984).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 10. Indeed, it has been stated that, "The state must be
subject to the higher law of God." C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE SECULAR STATE 135 (1979).
17. Id. See J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 156 (2d ed. 1969); R.
14.

ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y

NEUHAS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

(1984).
18. Hyde, Keeping God in the Closet: Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of
Religious Values from Public Life, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 33,
36 (1984).
19. Id. at 43.
20. Id.
21. McBrien, The Church and Politics, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 57, 64 (1984).
22. Id. at 59.
23. J. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 157.
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tional moral policies. 2 '
Basil Cardinal Hume, the Archbishop of Westminster in
England, has observed that the crisis of modern society is to
be found in "the abandonment of objective moral principles
and the dogmatism of permissiveness. ' .. Perhaps this is but
another way of observing that-as to Americans at
least-emotions and prejudices commonly override reason."'
There can be little doubt that the self-centered doctrine of
ME is important and all-consuming to many members of
modern society. Perhaps in no greater area of concern than
procreation do emotions rise to high and often uncontrolled
levels; for it appears that an inextricable concomitant of procreation is abortion.
The depth of ferment and controversy within the Roman
Catholic Church was displayed in early 1985, in the results of
a private survey of Roman Catholic theologians and biblical
scholars from three important Catholic organizations-the
Catholic Theological Society, the Catholic Biblical Association and the College Theology Society. The survey revealed
that 62% of those polled (almost 500 persons, including 325
priests and religious) refused to equate abortion with murder;
49% acknowledged that, on some occasions, abortion can be
recognized as a moral choice; and 49% believed that there
are times when an act of abortion should be left legally to the
pregnant woman.27
Given this disparity of attitudes among the clergy and
the ranking theologians, it is easy to understand how the laity
are bewildered as they consider the mysteries of in vitro fertilization and how their fundamental attitudes and perceptions
concerning abortion will be translated into similar problem
areas of the new reproductive biology. Tragically, the percentage of Catholics supporting the legalization of abortion
24. R. Drinan, Religion and Politics in the United States in the Next
Fifteen Years 20 (paper delivered at the Conference on Religion and Politics at Kenyon College, April 18-21, 1985).
25. London Times, June 6, 1985, at 12, col. 2. As Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger has observed, "Economic liberalism creates its exact counterpart,
permissivism, on the moral plane." J. RATZINGER, THE RATZINGER REPORT OF
THE CHURCH 83 (1985). He continued by stating that, "Separated from
motherhood, sex has remained without a locus and has lost its point of
reference: it is a kind of drifting mine, a problem and at the same time an
omnipresent power." Id. at 84.
26. J. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 159.
27. Anderson, Catholic Scholars Express Varied Abortion Views, Wash.
Post, Feb. 9, 1985, at B6, col. 5.
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countenanced by Roe v. Wade 8 has continued to rise since the
decision in 1973; today, ten to twelve per cent of Catholics
agree with
the official church teaching that abortion is always
29
wrong.
The problem of abortion cannot truly be passed off as
another governmental failure, for no administrative agency
or department within government is forcing women to have
abortions.3 0 And, as observed, the statistics demonstrate
clearly that Catholics support the "right" to abortion proportionately with the rest of the population and thus ignore the
teaching of the Church that such acts are sinful.3 What is
evident in the efforts to criminalize abortion is perhaps little
more than a plea to the government "to make criminal what
we believe to be sinful because we ourselves cannot stop committing the sin."13 2 Accordingly, perhaps the better view here
is to recognize that, "[t]he failure is not Caesar's. This failure
is our failure, the failure of the entire people of God." 3
The goal set by the members of the pro-life movement
has been nothing less than a total prohibition of abortion.
Yet, the feasibility of obtaining this goal in a pluralistic society is doubtful, to say the least. 4 In answer to the question
whether Catholics would choose to cooperate with other likeminded Americans of similar ethical persuasion in working
for a more restrictive abortion law, one would hope that they
would cooperate; for surely there would be no compromise
of the fundamental belief in the sanctity of all human life. 3 5
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Hyer, U.S. Bishops Rebuke Dissenters on Abortion, Wash. Post, Nov.
17, 1984, at D10, col. 1.
30. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's
Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13, 26 (1984).
As Charles E. Rice has observed so eloquently, "We cannot look to government to relieve the problems it has helped to create. The decline of the
churches' influence, it is fair to say, has been in direct proportion to their
willingness to turn their responsibilities over to the state and to become
beneficiaries of government handouts." C. RICE, supra note 16, at 134.
31. Hyer, supra note 29.
32. Cuomo, supra note 30, at 26.
33. Id. One preeminent authority has concluded, "The disintegration of the family is reflected in American law which in turn accelerates
that disintegration. Apart from the rapidly growing adoption of no-fault
divorce laws, the decisions of the Supreme Court reflect an atomistic view
of the family that is hostile to the Christian tradition." C. RICE, supra note
16, at 84.
34. Hesburgh, Reflections on Cuomo: The Secret Consensus, 1 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53, 56 (1984).
35. Id.
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"We should continue to hold ourselves to a higher standard
than we can persuade society at large to write into law." 3 6 In
this regard, then, what some may consider to be extremism
in the defense of life can never be viewed correctly as a vice
just as moderation in the pursuit87 of common justice for all
cannot be prized as a real virtue.

"Extremism" in the defense of traditional family structures and their inherent social, ethical, religious and political
values can never be viewed as a vice, just as "moderation" in
the pursuit of justice can never be prized as a real virtue. We
must be ever vigilant to the need to protect the orthodoxy
and sanctity of the family unit.
II. To BE

OR NOT TO BE?

The issue of abortion, as it arises in the process of in vitro
fertilization, becomes topical during the laparoscopy (or procedure whereby eggs are removed from a woman's reproductive tract). Following this procedure, eggs that may have been
produced in response to drug therapy for super-ovulation are
stored for subsequent fertilization and implantation or experimentation. 8 If all the eggs are fertilized by the sperm from
a married woman's husband and placed in her uterus, there is
no problem. But when some eggs are stored for later efforts
to impregnate-should the first attempt fail-or for the purpose of genetic experimentation, the contentious issue of
abortion rises to the fore. Ethical complexities attend each of
the many variations on the basic IVF theme. When, for example, artificial insemination is used to fertilize a married woman's egg with the sperm of a man other than her husband
because her husband's sperm is defective, a serious ethical issue is posed. The same is true when a third party surrogate
carries an embryo to term for a genetic mother who is unable
to do so for herself or when a single woman seeks to avail
herself of IVF procedures. Because of restrictions on space
and coverage, 9 this article will not take on all of the ethical
36.

Id.

37. Cf Speech by Hon. Barry M. Goldwater in Proceedings, 28th
Republican National Convention, San Francisco, July 13-16, 1964, at 419.
38. See generally The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46
passim. See also PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION:
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (M. Brumby ed. 1982) (conference held at the

Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, Melbourne, Mar. 11, 1982).
39. Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artficial Fathers and
Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 639 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Razor's Edge]. See generally Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial In-
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issues raised by IVF. It will instead proceed selectively.
By way of summarizing broadly, attention is now drawn
to what might be termed as the "ethical morality" of in vitro
fertilization-or the benefits and the harms of its use. 40 The
most obvious benefit of the procedure is that it circumvents
infertility and thereby allows those married couples with a
strong desire to have children of their own to raise a family
and to bring fulfillment and happiness to their marriage.
Should it be determined conclusively that frozen embryos can
be used without damage to the resultant child, in vitro fertilization will enable women who so wish to pursue careers and
then have children by using embryos created some years earlier-thereby reducing the chance of producing a child with
Down's syndrome. Outside the scope of family expansion, in
vitro fertilization could be used to provide embryos that could
be used in scientific and medical experiments, not only in
cancer research but as a source of obtaining embryonic tissue
used in the treatment of diseases such as diabetes and to harvest organs for transplantation.
There are several major objections to in vitro fertilization. The first is tied to the concern that separating sex from
procreation is inherently wrong. The practice of in vitro fertilization followed by embryo transfer to the uterus of the
semination and the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1968). See also Annas & Elias,
In Vitro Fertilizationand Embryo Transfer: Medico-Legal Aspects of a New Technique to Creat a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199 (1983).
40. The following sources served as references for the presentation
of arguments opposing and favoring the use of in vitro fertilization: MAKING BABIES: THE TEST TUBE AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (A. Nichols and T. Hogan eds. 1984); R. MCCORMICK, How BRAVE A NEW WORLD? chs. 1, 16
(1981); TEST-TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES (W. Walters and P. Singer eds. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as TEST-TUBE BABIES]; M. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983); Hearings on Human Embryo Transfer Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Daniel, The Morality of in Vitro
Fertilization, in MORAL STUDIES: SCIENCE-HUMANITY GOD 47 (T. Kennedy ed.
1984); Harris, In Vitro Fertilization: The Ethical Issues, 33 PHIL. Q 217
(1983); Editorial, In Vitro Fertilization, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 187 (1983); Robertson, In Vitro Conception and Harm to the Unborn, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.
1978, at 13; Studdard, The Morality of in Vitro Fertilization, 5 HUMAN LIFE
REV. 41 (1979); Tiefel, Human in Vitro Fertilization:A Conservative View, J.
A.M.A. 3235 (1982); Walters, Human in Vitro Fertilization: A Review of the
Ethical Literature, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1979, at 23; M. Tooley, Legal, Ethical and Moral Dilemmas of the New Biology: The Challenges of in
Vitro Reproductive Technology (June 22, 1984) (lecture given at the University of Western Australia, Perth).
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married woman severs the very connection between sex and
reproduction. The second major objection maintains that in
vitro fertilization is morally wrong because it involves the risk
of harm to the individual who is subsequently brought into
existence. The harm (although not documented factually)
could be either in the nature of physical damage or abnormality resulting from the IVF process or from the subsequent
process of transferring the embryo to the genetic mother's or
birth mother's womb (in the case of a surrogate) or from psychological harm that might inure to the infant born of the
total process.
The third objection holds that the use of IVF as a means
to produce embryos to be used for experiments or as sources
of tissue and organs-as opposed to being implanted-is
wrong because it subjects the embryo to pain. This objection
would have considerable merit where experiments were, in
fact, to be conducted on substantially developed fetuses.
When conducting such scientific interventions with embryos
in the first several weeks of their development, such embryos
probably do not experience pain, owing to the absence of a
critical nervous system."1
The fourth objection is that even though IVF may be
properly viewed as neither wrong in itself nor wrong because
of its effects upon those immediately involved, it may be
wrong because of the "slippery slope" to which it is likely to
lead. Thus, in vitro fertilization together with embryo transfer may lead to unimpeded use of surrogate mothers as substitutes for genetic mothers, the dissolution of the family unit
by the use of the process by women who do not wish to
marry or have sexual relations with a man, or even lead to
the development of artificial wombs (ectogenesis) whereby
women no longer need to have "contact" with their children
until after they are, so to speak, born.42
Finally, as noted previously, the last objection to the IVF
process is that it involves either the destruction or freezing of
embryos not implanted. In the former situation, an action
morally akin to abortion is committed; but in the case of
freezing, there may or may not be a comparable action-for
such depends upon whether it is possible to thaw the embryo
successfully, and upon whether it is likely that the embryo
41.
42.
KELLY,

TOOLEY, supra note 2,
TEST-TUBE BABIES, supra

M.

THE EMERGENCE

AMERICA

(1979).

OF ROMAN

chs. 5-7.
note 40, chs. 8, 11. See generally D.
CATHOLIC MEDICAL

ETHICS IN NORTH
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will ultimately be implanted. The only apparent way to resolve these uncertainties would be to continue with limited
experimentation in the field, using lower animal life forms.
III.

THE AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH INITIATIVES

In 1982, the National Health and Medical Research
Council of Australia structured national ethical guidelines for
use of in vitro fertilization procedures."3 Guideline seven suggests an upper time limit of ten years upon the storage of
embryos-the storage would not be extended beyond "the
time of conventional reproductive need or competence of the
female donor."" Thus, applied to a woman's capability to
conceive, it is clear that at death, a woman's reproductive capability has ended and any fertilized ovum left in cryopreservation could be destroyed. The Council endorsed not
only the use of IVF as an acceptable scientific procedure to
correct infertility among married couples,4 5 but also the use
of donor eggs in women to produce embryos,' and the
use
7
of artificial insemination by anonymous male donors.'
In early 1982, the Victorian government entered the
vanguard of the new reproductive biology by establishing a
committee, headed by Professor Louis Waller, to investigate
the problems arising from in vitro fertilization and donor gametes (or the male sperm and female eggs). Soon to follow
are similar governmental inquiries organized in Queensland
and Western Australia.""
The Waller Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by in vitro Fertilization was released in August, 1984,
in Melbourne, Australia, by the Attorney General of the state
of Victoria. The Committee concluded, among other matters, that the disposition of stored embryos is not to be determined by the hospital where they are in fact stored; 9 that
43.

NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ETHICS IN

MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING THE HUMAN FETUS AND HUMAN FETAL TISSUE

(1983).
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

36 (supplementary note 4,
35 (supplementary note 4,
35-36 (supplementary note
36 (supplementary note 4,

guideline 7).
guideline 2).
4, guidelines 3-4).
guideline 6).

48. Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experimental Medicine, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 55-60 (1985). See

Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, The Life and Strange Times of Elsa Rios,
AUSTL. BULL., July 3, 1984, at 22, 25 [hereinafter cited as Elsa Rios].
49. THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ON THE DISPOSITION OF EM-
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such embryos do not possess legal rights or rights to lay claim
to inheritance; 0 and in cases where "by mischance or for any
other reason, an embryo is stored which cannot be transferred as planned, and no agreed provision has been made at
the time of storage . . .the embryos shall be removed from
storage."5 The Committee also held that embryos could be
frozen 62 and that experimental research "shall be immediate
and in an approved and current project in which the embryo
shall not be allowed to develop beyond the state of implantation, which is completed 14 days after fertilization."" Some
of the recommendations of the Committee will be incorporated in the Victorian government's in vitro legislative proposals for subsequent parliamentary consideration, while
others will be open to further debate and study."
A.

Melbourne's Orphan Embryos

On May 20, 1981, a married couple from Los Angeles-Mario and Elsa Rios-were allowed to participate in the
in vitro fertilization program in Melbourne, Australia-specifically, the one operating from the Queen Victoria
Medical Center.5 5 Because of his infertility, Mr. Rios consented to the participation of an anonymous donor from Melbourne and thereupon artificial insemination was achieved
successfully for three eggs provided by his wife. One embryo
was implanted in Mrs. Rios on June 8, 1981, and the other
two frozen for subsequent use. Because of the trauma associated with a miscarriage of the implanted embryo, Mrs. Rios
was not emotionally fit to participate in another attempt at
impregnation. Before she was physically and mentally willing
to seek an implantation of the remaining embryos, she and
her husband died in a plane crash in Chile."0 Because Mr.
and Mrs. Rios had not executed a will, the California laws of
intestate succession allowed Mr. Rios' son by a previous marriage a right to his father's share of the estate and the
mother of Mrs. Rios was entitled to take her daughter's
PRODUCED BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION § 2.16 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Waller Report].
50. Id. § 2.19.
51. Id. § 2.18.
52. Id. §§ 3.25-3.28.
53. Id. § 3.29.
54. See Victoria Will Bar Payments to Surrogate Mothers, Sydney Morning Herald, Sept. 4, 1984, at 3, col. 2.
55. Elsa Rios, supra note 48, at 25.
56. Id. at 23.
BRYOS
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Professor Louis Waller, Chairman of Victoria's Law Reform Commission, determined in August, 1984, that the embryos had no independent legal "rights" to be unfrozen and
implanted in a surrogate mother and, therefore, he recommended that they should be thawed and discarded." The
Victoria state legislature ordered that the remaining Rios'
embryos be preserved in their liquid nitrogen container.5' As
of August 29, 1985, the embryos remained in cryopreservation awaiting the appearance of a volunteer surrogate mother
for their thawing and implantation."
B.

The Warnock Committee

In 1982, four years after the birth of the world's first
test-tube baby,"' the British government constituted a Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology
and directed its members, chaired by Dame Mary Warnock,
to examine not only the social implications of the new reproductive biology but its ethical and legal implications as well.
The Committee submitted its report in July, 1984, and great
debate and discussion has followed."
In essence, the Warnock Committee approved the cryopreservation of embryos-but only under strict constraints
and subject to review by a statutory licensing authority. 8
The Committee recognized that even though embryos enjoyed an ethical or moral ("special") status, research could
continue on them-but subject to careful monitoring for a
fourteen day period after they had been fertilized." Further,
"spare" embryos could be proper subjects for research within
57. CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 6401-6402 (West 1985). See also Wallis,
Quickening Debate Over Life on Ice, TIME, July 2, 1984, at 46.
58. Waller Report, supra note 49, §§ 2.14-2.19. See also Elsa Rios,
supra note 48.
59. London Times, Oct. 25, 1984, at 7, col. 2.
60. See Letter from Louis Waller, Chairperson of The Law Reform
Commission of Victoria, to George Smith (August 29, 1985) (available in
the offices of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy).
61. Steptoe & Edwards, Birth after the Re-Implantation of a Human
Embryo, LANCET, 366 (1978); The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978,
at 58.
62. Priest, The Report of the Warnock Committee on the Human Fertilization and Embryology, 48 MOD. L. REV. 73 (1985). See also Glazebrook, Human
Beginnings, 43 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 209 (1984).
63. Priest, supra note 62 passim. See also The Warnock Committee, 289
BRIT. MED. J. 238 passim (1984).
64. Priest, supra note 62 passim.
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this time period if informed consent to such actions is obtained from the couple generating the embryo. 6 The Committee also recommended that legislation be enacted to allow
research on any embryonic life derived from in vitro fertilization-regardless of the fact that the embryo was intentionally
or unintentionally developed for research-and that ten
years be the maximum allowable time for storage (with the
right of disposal passing to the storage authority after that
time period).6"
Regarding rights of inheritance, the Committee proposed legislation which would eliminate the dilemma of Australia's "orphan" embryos by providing that any child born
of an IVF procedure that had used an embryo either frozen
or stored, "who was not in utero at the death of the father
shall be disregarded for the purposes of succession to the inheritance from the latter." ' And, concerning the issue of
surrogation, or the use of surrogate mothers, the Committee
proposed legislation that would impose a criminal sanction
for the maintenance of surrogate mother agencies, but the
Committee simultaneously suggested that those individuals
entering into private surrogation arrangements, in connection with in vitro fertilization procedures for example, be exempted from criminal prosecution. 8
In the United States, because of a de facto moratorium
set in 1975, no federally funded research has been undertaken on in vitro fertilization,"9 even though the 1979 Report
of the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (now Department of Health and
Human Services) concluded that federal support of research
on human in vitro fertilization, in order to establish both the
safety and the effectiveness of IVF procedures, would be ethically permissible so long as certain conditions were met."0
The report has never been accepted, however, nor the mora65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id., proposal 63.
Id.
Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research,

CENTER REP.,

HASTINGS

Feb. 1984, at 5.

70. Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human in Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg.
35,034, 35,057 (1979). Among these conditions were that the blastocyst be
sustained no longer than beyond the implantation stage and that in vitro
fertilization be used only by married couples who had donated their sperm
and ova. Id.
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torium ended-nor is there any
real likelihood that action of
71
this nature will be taken soon.

IV.

A BASIC RIGHT TO PROCREATE-FOR WHOM?

As modern society continues to evolve and change, so
too do many of its values, including privacy.7 2 Autonomy,
self-representation, personhood, identity, intimacy and dignity are all essentials of privacy.73 The extent to which these
essentials play a role in shaping a degree of sexual, procreational autonomy must surely remain largely fluid and flexible,
for to attempt to define them with precision would challenge
and erode any efficacy that they may enjoy.7 4 The right of
the state to control and shape the behavior of both individuals and groups regarding the birth of children is always an
area of high emotion and legitimate concern.
The most widely held view is that private conduct between consenting adults or, for that matter, personal conduct
of any nature, should be regulated only to the extent necessary to prevent harm to others. 5 Conformity is thus not a
value of momentous concern and certainly not a value worth
pursuing.78 The counter or conservative view is that the business of the law is to suppress vice and immorality simply because if violations of the very moral structure are indulged
and promoted, such actions would surely undermine the
whole basis of society itself.7" Under the former view, the

state would be justified-arguably-in acting to control personal decision-making-if not for the need to prevent illegitimates from proliferating, then to prevent the ultimate economic harm to society of having to help bear the expenses
associated with the maintenance and education of a fatherless
child born of artificial insemination. Similarly, the prevention
of harm theory could be invoked in surrogation where the
state, by preventing such acts, seeks to maintain the dignity
and continuity of the family unit.
71.
72.

Abramowitz, supra note 69, at 6.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

73.

Id. § 15-2, at 889.

74.

Id. § 15-2, at 892.

75.

H.L.A.

LAW §

HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY

15-2 (1978).

57 (1963).

76. Id.
77. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 25 (1965). See Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
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A.

The Foundation

The first case to address tangentially what has now come
to be regarded as a fundamental right to procreate was Buck
v. Bell. 8 In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute
that permitted the sterilization of inmates in state institutions
who
suffered from a hereditary form of insanity or imbecility.79 This opinion, authored by Justice Holmes, was written
before the development of the fundamental right/compelling
state interest standard.8 Thus, it must be determined
whether the Court's opinion implicitly recognized the existence of a compelling state interest, or whether the Court
merely failed to perceive procreation as a fundamental
right.8 1 The latter appears to be the case; indeed, it has been
suggested that the Court's pervasive emphasis on the state's
right to promote the general welfare approximates a rational
basis standard of judicial review. 8
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,8" the Supreme Court again considered the validity of compulsory sterilization laws. Unlike
the Court in Bell, which found no equal protection violation, 4 the Skinner Court struck down Oklahoma's Habitual
78. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
79. Id. at 207.
80. Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems
Presented by the Test-Tube Baby, 20 EMORY L.J. 1045, 1054 (1979).
81. Id.
82. Note, Legislative Naiveti in Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 12
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1064, 1071 (1976).
Writing for the Court in Bell, Justice Holmes stated:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could
not call on those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned,
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
83. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
84. The Bell Court had used a revolving door rationale in rejecting
the claim of equal protection:
[T]he law does all that is needed when it does all that it can,
indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to
bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its
means allow. Of course so far as the operations enable those who
otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and
thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more
nearly reached.
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Criminal Sterilization Act on equal protection grounds. The
statute provided
for the sterilization
of habitual
criminals-anyone convicted of three felonies-but did not
consider felonies which arose from the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses. 88 The Court recognized initially that marriage and
procreation are fundamental to both the existence and survival of mankind.8 It then proceeded to observe, however,
that a classification distinguishing larcenists from embezzlers,
for purposes of criminal sterilization, represented a form of
invidious discrimination. Consequently, the Court subjected
the classification to strict
scrutiny and found it violated the
87
equal protection clause.
Although a number of Supreme Court decisions" have
since cited the Skinner case as at least validating-if not in
fact creating-a constitutional right to procreate,89 it is important to recognize precisely the contours of that right. In
both Bell and Skinner, the Court was confronted with sterilization statutes. Sterilization, unlike other methods of control
over human reproduction, is irreversible. 90 Thus, in discussing the procreative "right" affected by Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act, the Skinner Court aptly observed
that this "right [was] basic to the perpetuation of a race."9' 1
Given this background, the procreative right recognized in
Skinner was simply a right to remain fertile, and not an uninhibited right to engage in potentially procreative conduct.
Subsequent decisions which have focused on a fundamental
right to privacy have further delineated the contours of this
274 U.S. at 208.
85. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 537.
86. Id. at 541.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640
(1974).
89. Comment, supra note 80, at 1056. Indeed, it has been suggested
that this case has been incorrectly interpreted since "the Skinner Court
neither denied the state's right to sterilize nor established a constitutional
right to procreate. Rather, the Court expressly declared that the scope of
the states' police power was unaffected by its holding." Id.
90. See Relf v.Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974).
91. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 536. Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas stated: "The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or wreckless hands it can
cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither
and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law
touches." Id. at 541.
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right.
B.

Searchingfor a Fundamental Right to Sexual Privacy

Nowhere in the Constitution is there mention of a right
to privacy. Nor is any right of sexual freedom found within
the gambit of procreative rights recognized by the Supreme
Court; nor for that matter has the Court fashioned a general
right of personal privacy which is sufficiently broad-based to
permit sex outside marriage. 92
In Griswold v. Connecticut," however, the Supreme Court,
for the first time, recognized a constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, and invalidated part of a Connecticut statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives by married persons."
The protection of this aspect of procreative autonomy "was
'' 5
largely subsumed within a broad right of marital privacy 1
which "stressed the unity and independence of the married
couple and forbade undue inquiry into conjugal acts.""
From this, however, it cannot be argued that there must exist
a corresponding fundamental right to reproduce or to use artificial reproductive technology.9 ' For, as Justice Goldberg
made clear in his concurring opinion, Griswold "in no way
interfere[d] with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct," and thus the constitutionality of Connecticut's statutes prohibiting adultery and fornication remained beyond dispute.9 8
92. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 463,

538 (1983).
93. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
94. The Court observed that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from the guarantees that
help give them life and substance." Id. at 484. Thus, it is those "[v]arious
guarantees [which] create zones of privacy." Id.
95. Note, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94
HARv. L. REV. 1850, 1867 (1981). See also Eugenics and Family Planning,
supra note 7.
96. Comment, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1183 (1980).
97. Comment, supra note 80, at 1058.
98. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 498-99. But, Professor
Laurence Tribe has observed that since Griswold recognized as valid individual decisions not to bear a child, read as such and considered with Skinner, it forces the conclusion that whether in. fact one's body is to be the
source of new life must be regarded as a personal decision for the concerned individual alone. L. TRIBE, supra note 72, at 923.
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird,99 the Supreme Court was confronted with construing a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.
In holding that the statute violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court observed
that, "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 10 0 Accordingly, the Eisenstadt Court fleshed out the
procreative skeleton of Griswold, which initially appeared
confined to the so-called "sacred" precincts of relations between married persons.0 1 This decision, however, did no
more than refine a qualified right to procreative autonomy
blurred by the Griswold Court's emphasis on the marital
relation .10
In Roe v. Wade,' 0 8 the Court addressed squarely an integral part of the individual's right to procreative autonomy
when an unmarried woman in a class action suit challenged
the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws. The
Court articulated a new source of privacy derived from the
fourteenth amendment's standard of personal liberty and.inherent restrictions upon state action and held that this right
was sufficiently broad to embrace a decision made by a wo99. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
100. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
101. Id.
102. "It has been suggested that the Court's opinion was lacking in
candor, for it stated in broad dictum a major extension of the 'privacy
right' which could have justified its decision, while purporting to rest on a
strained conclusion that the statute involved failed even the minimal rationality test." Comment, supra note 96, at 1184.
Under an expansive liberal interpretation, Eisenstadt has been held to extend the right of privacy to all sexual activities. E.g., Miller v. Rumsfeld,
647 F.2d 80, 85 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855
(1981); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973), af'd, 539
F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Neville v.
State, 290 Md. 364, 390, 430 A.2d 570, 583 (1981) (Davidson, J., dissenting). See Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protectionfor Personal Lifestyles,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 589 (1977).
A narrow, more conservative construction views Eisenstadt as merely recognizing a freedom to decide issues related to the birth of a child. See, e.g.,
Neville v. State, 290 Md. at 374, 430 A.2d at 575; People v. Onofre, 51
N.Y.2d 476, 499, 415 N.E.2d 936, 946, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 957 (Gabrielli,
J., dissenting); State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 816-17, 413 A.2d 58, 68

(1980).
103.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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man whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."" The
Court, however, went further to state that it was not recognizing "an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases."lob
The final pertinent case of interest in this area is Carey v.
Population Services International.' In Carey, the Supreme
Court invalidated a New York statute which regulated the
sale and distribution of contraceptives to minors and stated
that "at the very heart of [the] cluster of constitutionally protected choices," recognized in the previous privacy cases,107
10 8
was "the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child."'
This decision is particularly instructive on the question of the
104. Id. at 153. This right, however, was not absolute and the degree
of involvement allowed would be continued on the length of the pregnancy. "[P]rior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's attending physician." Id. at 164. After this stage,
the "State may . . regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the
regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Id. Finally, after viability, the state may protect fetal life and
"may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 163-64.
Unless scientists develop an artificial womb, Dr. Robert Hayaski, the
head of obstetrics at the University of California, Los Angeles-Harbor
Medical Center, does not forsee any dramatic changes of survival rates for
infants before the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. In addition to this observation made at the annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science held in May, 1985, in Los Angeles, several participants argued that the importance of viability has been inflated and that the
United States Supreme Court should determine a legal time frame in the
second half of pregnancy "beyond which states could not prohibit abortion." It was pointed out that in 1973 when Roe v. Wade was decided, the
threshold of viability was around 28 weeks of pregnancy and only approximately 50% of infants born then could be expected to survive. Today, with
advances in medical technology, the threshold has dropped to about 24
weeks-with nearly all 28-week-old babies surviving. Russell, Lawyers Question Letting Fetus Viability Shape Abortion Law, Wash. Post, May 29, 1985, at
A4, col. 1. See also Comment, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The
Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1194 (1982).
105. Id. at 154. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Buck v.
Bell, which led one commentator to observe: "As it is difficult to imagine a
more substantial interference with procreation than compulsory sterilization, the limited nature of the recognized procreative 'right' is apparent."
Note, supra note 95, at 1868.
106. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion).
107. In addition to the privacy cases already analyzed in this article,
the Court cited Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
108. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
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unmarried woman's right to artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilization procedures, for it examines the previous privacy
cases and delineates the extent of the individual's right to
procreative autonomy.
It has been suggested that since a woman has a right to
terminate her pregnancy and to use contraceptives, a posteriori, the conduct required to bring about those procreative
choices must also be protected. '1 9 The Court's opinion in Carey indicates, however, that this is simply not the case.
First, with regard to contraception and abortion, the
Court made clear that it is "[the] individual's right to decide
to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy" that is protected. 10 Such unequivocal language, however, lends little or
no support to the argument that a concomitant right to conceive is also protected. Second, the Court emphasized that its
decision did not encompass any constitutional questions
raised by state statutes regulating either sexual freedom or
adult sexual relations."' This reading of Carey is supported
by a later decision of the Court which stated that if "the right
to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right
to enter the only relationship in which the [s]tate . . . allows
sexual relations to legally take place."' 12 Thus, the lesson
from the Court's decisions in Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt,
Roe, and Carey is plain: "procreative autonomy . . . includes
both the right to remain fertile and the right to avoid conception," 1 8 but absolutely nothing more.
C.

State Justificationfor Intervention

Since the unmarried woman's decision to be artificially
109. Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 26,
27-28 (1981).
110. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 688 n.5. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
68 n.15 (1973) (implication that state fornication statutes do not violate the
federal constitution). But see State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333
(1977) (holding that fornication statute involves by its very nature a personal choice and that it infringes upon the right of privacy).
112. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1977). See Doe v. Commonwealth Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd, 425 U.S.
901 (1976) (summary affirmance of three-judge district court decision holding that the state of Virginia could constitutionally apply its sodomy statute
to private sexual conduct between consenting male adults). See also Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113. Comment, supra note 96, at 1185. See also Wilkinson & White,
supra note 102, at 591-94.
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inseminated or to participate in an in vitro fertilization procedure does not fall within the gambit of any recognized fundamental right, state statutes limiting this procreative technology to married women "[may] be sustained under the less
demanding test of rationality
"114 Under this test, the
distinction drawn must be "rationally related" to a "constitutionally permissible" objective.'" In employing this rather relaxed standard, courts must be sensitive to the fact "that the
drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.""' 6
Absent a suspect classification or the infringement of a
fundamental right, the Supreme Court has recognized that
legislation "protecting legitimate family relationships" as well
as both the regulation and protection of the family unit are
"venerable concerns of the state."1 7 Statutes limiting the
availability of artificial insemination to married women and
those which might (indeed, should) be drafted to limit the use
of IVF procedures to married women, fall squarely within
this classification.
As early as 1888, the Court recognized marriage as "the
foundation of the family and society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress.""' 8 Recently, the
Court observed that "a decision to marry and raise a child in
the traditional family setting must receive . . . protection.""' 9 Thus, although certain aspects of an individual's
right to procreative autonomy have correctly been divorced
from the familial and marriage relationship, the Court has
also implicitly recognized that, whenever possible, childbearing should take place within the traditional family unit. 2 0 An
unmarried woman's decision to seek artificial insemination or
to participate in an IVF procedure goes directly against the
tide of these pronouncements.
An instructive analogy may be made to the law of adoption. Adoption statutes, like the statutes regulating artificial
114.
115.
116.

(1975).

Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1976).
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314

117. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
118. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
119. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1977).
120. See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 405 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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insemination, have their genesis in state law.1" 1 Although all
states currently allow adoption by unmarried adults,122 it occurs only in rare cases. In In re Adoption of Infant H., 23 an
unmarried middle-aged woman sought to adopt a thirteenmonth-old child, for whom parental care by a young couple
was available. In rejecting her application, the court
observed:
Adoption by a single person has generally and in this
Court's experience been sought and approved only in exceptional circumstances, and in particular for the hard-toplace child for whom no desirable parental couple is available. In the universal view of both experts and laymen, while
one parent may be better than none for the hard-to-place
child, joint responsibility by a father and a mother contributes to the child's physical, financial and psychic security as
well as his emotional growth. This view is more than a matter of present convention, anthropologists pointing out that
the institution of marriage, which is a method of signifying
commitment to such joint responsibility, evolved in response to the need for two-parent care of children.'
This observation applies with equal force to artificial insemination for an unmarried woman as well as her participation
in an in vitro fertilization program.1 2 5 Indeed, if a state may
121. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Finch, 310 F. Supp. 1251 (D.S.C. 1970); In
re Jarboe's Estate, 235 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1964).
122. Kritchevsky, supra note 109, at 31.
123. 69 Misc. 2d 304, 330 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1972).
124. Id. at 314, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 245. Cf Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). In upholding
the statutory and regulatory procedures for the removal of foster children
from foster homes, the Court stated in Smith that: "Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution, that interest
must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to the natural parents." Id. at 847.
125. It has been suggested that the artificial insemination process in
fact makes
it less likely that the parent will be indigent or emotionally unfit to
care for the child . . . . First, because the procedure of Al itself is
expensive, its use would tend to be limited to the nonindigent.
Second, prospective Al mothers . . . receive screening and counseling to ensure that they are fit to become parents . . . . Third,
• . . use of Al guarantees that the child is born into a home that
sincerely wants it, and there is no reason to believe that this is less
true in the single parent than the dual parent home . . ..
[Flinally, since a woman refused Al remains free to choose to conceive through sexual intercourse, any state rationale arguing that
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reasonably regulate unmarried adults in their quest to adopt
children, it would be anomalous to suggest that it could not
regulate the use of a procreative technology designed to
bring children into the world.
More importantly, however, the unmarried woman's access to artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization and, thus,
surrogation, directly undermines not only the concept of
marriage, but the family as well and hence the very foundation of society. 12 The courts have repeatedly recognized the
desirability of having a child reared within a traditional family unit. Moreover, it is clear that the marital relationship
serves as the very genesis of the family unit. 2 7 Accordingly,
the inherent procreative potential of this union, 2 ' together
with the stability that this provides to the social fabric,'2 9
would be dealt a mortal wound by permitting unmarried
women to assert total procreational autonomy through the
use of the new reproductive technologies.1 0
Another argument made against state intervention is
that action taken by the state in this area of procreational
autonomy seeks to paint with too broad a brush when it limits
artificial insemination to married couples or withholds approval or licensure of IVF procedures unless one is married.
Although the Supreme Court has failed to formulate a coneliminating Al will protect it financially or will protect children is
irrational.
Kritchevsky, supra note 109, at 29.
126. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. at 843.
127. Comment, supra note 96, at 1270.
128. If approved and encouraged by the state, artificial insemination
tends to upset the traditional, totally private, monogamous method of
human reproduction. By sanctioning the intervention of a third party (the
donor) into the process, the state is approving a trend toward treating reproduction as a social, as opposed to a private, act. Artificial insemination
also creates a potential for direct state intervention into the reproductive
process. Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty,
23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1409 (1972).
129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
130. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980), where it is maintained that procreation is considered fundamental
because it "strongly implicates the values of intimate association, particularly the values of caring and commitment, intimacy, and self-identification." Id. at 640. These values may not be found in the unmarried woman's desire to engage in artificial insemination-thus lending further
credence and support to a state's interest in limiting the use to married
women. Id.
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crete definition of the family, Moore v. City of East Cleveland"'1
represents a clear extension of protection that is routinely afforded to the "nuclear" family to one recognized as a "quasifamilial group."13 2 In Moore, a zoning ordinance which limited an area to single family dwellings was challenged by a
woman who shared her home with her two grandsons. The
Court merely recognized that the extended family occupies a
place in American tradition similar to that of the nuclear
family, and thus is to be guaranteed protection by the
Constitution. 3'
As the procreation and privacy cases clearly illustrate by
analogy, however, the fact that a mother and her offspring
may find protection within the nuclear family structure does
not imply a right to freely bring about that condition-nor
does it demonstrate that the limitations placed on artificial
insemination, or on in vitro fertilization for that matter, with
respect to unmarried women are in any way irrational or unreasonable. Thus it assuredly demands an expanded definition of family in order to contend that statutes limiting artificial insemination or the new reproductive technologies to
married women are not rationally related to a constitutionally
permissible objective. The line of demarcation may be drawn
imprecisely, but the Constitution is not offended "simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality.' ,,u
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The legal system, by protecting such relationships as kinship and formal marriage, promotes not only those interests
of private parties, but the interests of society in those social
and political structures which ensure a long-term individual
view of liberty."3 In judicial decisions affording familial and
marital relationships a higher degree of constitutional protection, traditions have played a pivotal role. In the procreative
field, the Supreme Court has carved out a limited degree of
autonomy for the individual.
As this article has demonstrated, a woman's fundamental
131. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
132. Comment, supra note 96, at 1272.
133. Id. at 1271.
134. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1969) (quoting Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1910)). But see M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).
135. Hafen, supra note 92, at 559.
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right to privacy or procreation does not encompass a right to
artificial insemination or use of new reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, or surrogation. Accordingly,
statutes limiting the use of these new reproductive technologies need only be rationally related to the promotion of a
constitutionally permissible state interest. A state's desire to
promote the raising of children in the traditional family setting while at the same time promoting the institution of marriage and the family is an unquestionably permissible, if not
laudable, objective.
Thirty years ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter cautioned:
"Children have a very special place in life which the law
should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in cases
readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred.""18 The legislature, in limiting the practices and use
of the new biological technologies to married women, have
taken-and should continue to take-this admonition seriously. The extended use and application of these procedures
primarily through artificial insemination and surrogation
must be controlled strictly by legislative design. Surrogation
should only be tolerated by a married woman, with her husband's actual consent, and then only under proper medically
supervised standards. As a medical aid to infertility, in vitro
fertilization and surrogation should then be allowed only as
last relief adjuncts to medical treatment of this impediment
and not as a popular or novel experience to be championed
on street corners and smoke-filled convention floors.
A legislative program designed to validate, and thereby
license, the in vitro fertilization process and its inextricable
use and reliance upon surrogation for married women, as
well as the married surrogates participating therein, would
not only seek to protect the health and well-being of the issue
born but also would assure the safety of the surrogate. Such a
legislative program would ideally include provisions shaping
the rights and determining the extent of the liabilities of the
contracting parents in the IVF-surrogate compact vis-a-vis
not only the infant, but give due consideration as well to
shaping the sphere of responsibility for various types of errors that intermediaries-such
as doctors and lawyers-might commit in facilitating the whole process. Ideally,
the specific policy matters coincident with the administration
of an IVF-surrogation program, once structured, would be
136. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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implemented by an administrative body or licensing board,
where the policies and standards for evaluating and processing requests for surrogate mothering would be both comprehensive and equitable in their design and utilization."'
The new reproductive biological techniques for
parenthood portend an enormous opportunity of untold significance for humanity and demand the need for a searching
inquiry into the parameters for future development.'3 8 The
legislative branch of government is far better equipped to
deal with this inquiry than is the executive or judicial, and is
potentially a more responsive forum for posturing and advocacy by the various religions which must assume their roles as
stalwart guides in the search for insightful, yet humane, lawmaking responses.1 39 Thoughtful study and a cautious plan of
action are needed now, before advancing complexities become genuine crises that overwhelm, confuse and confound
the role of the rule of law in meeting the challenges of the
brave and pluralistic new world of tomorrow which-in actuality-are already here.

137. Razor's Edge, supra note 39. See also Brophy, A Surrogate Mother
Contract to Bear Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (1981).
138. R. ScoTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 221 (1981).
139. See supra notes 15-20. See also Culliton, Science's Restive Public,
107 DAEDALUS 147 (1978). See generally Marcin, Justice and Love, 33 CATH.
U.L. REV. 363 (1984).

